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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). On June 19, 2002, the trial court entered an order granting 
defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Record 
on Appeal ("RA"), at 543-42.) On August 6, 2002, the trial certified the dismissal of the 
complaint as a final judgment. (RA 518-16.) 
II, STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined 
that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution bars Utah's asserting 
personal jurisdiction over Henry Taylor when (a) Taylor's only connection with Utah is 
his status as an officer or director of a corporation that issued securities in Utah through 
allegedly misleading information, and (b) Utah law creates a rebuttable presumption that 
Taylor, merely by virtue of his status as an officer or director, may be jointly and 
severally liable under Utah's securities laws. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(RA 559-52.) 
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant under Utah law and the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for "correctness." D.A. v. State (In the Interest of W.A.), 63 P.3d 607, 611 
(Utah 2002). The Court may affirm the trial court's ruling "if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though that ground or theory was not 
identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Id 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action arises out of the July 1997 issuance of pollution control bonds 
(the "Bonds") by Tooele County (the "Bond Issuance"). The Bonds were secured by a 
loan agreement for which Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("LESI") and its 
successor Safety-Kleen Corporation ("Safety-Kleen"), a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in South Carolina, was the primary obligor. (RA 22, ^ j 1.) 
2. Appellants1 are institutional purchasers of the Bonds, each of which is 
foreign to Utah. (RA 21, ffil 4-9.) 
3. Appellants claim venue is proper in Tooele County, Utah, based upon a 
forum selection clause contained in the Indenture of Trust between the County of Tooele, 
as issuer, and U.S. Bank, as trustee, dated July 1, 1997. (RA 22, f 2.) None of the 
individual defendants, including Henry Taylor ("Taylor"), was a party to the Indenture of 
Trust. (RA 285-193.) 
4. Appellants' Complaint - the substance of which is alleged solely on 
information and belief- sets forth five (5) causes of action, only three (3) of which are 
pled against Taylor. In general, the Complaint alleges that the named defendants 
participated in and/or aided and abetted LESI with respect to materially false statements 
regarding LESI's financial condition. With respect to Taylor, the complaint alleges 
causes of action under Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(4), as well as a claim 
1
 "Appellants" refers to MFS Series Trust III (on behalf of MFS Municipal High Income 
Fund), Merrill Lynch High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., Muniholdings Fund, Inc., 
Merrill Lynch Munch Municipal Bond Fund, The National Portfolio, Merrill Lynch 
Municipal Strategy Fund, Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc., 
John Hancock Funds, Inc., and Putnum Investments, Inc., collectively. 
for negligent misrepresentation. (RA 10-02, fflf 67-76, 77-88, 108-121.) There are no 
allegations of any intentional conduct by Taylor. (Id.) 
5. Taylor is a resident of Columbia, South Carolina, and has been a resident of 
South Carolina all of his life. Until November 16, 2001, Taylor was the Senior Vice 
President, Secretary and General Counsel of Safety-Kleen. On November 16, 2001, 
Taylor resigned his position as Senior Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel of 
Safety-Kleen and now serves as Special Counsel and consultant to Safety-Kleen. (RA 
185,11.) 
6. From May 1997 until January 9, 2001, Taylor held the office of Vice 
President, Secretary and General Counsel of Safety-Kleen. Safety-Kleen was known as 
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("LESI") from May 1997 through November 24, 
1998 (although LESI did business as Safety-Kleen from July 1, 1998 through November 
24, 1998). From May 1990 until May 1997, Taylor served as Secretary and Vice 
President, Legal Affairs of Laidlaw Environmental Services (US), Inc., renamed Safety-
Kleen (US), Inc. in July 1998; and thereafter merged into Safety-Kleen Services, Inc. in 
September 1998. (RA 185, f 1.) 
7. Safety-Kleen maintains its principal executive offices in Columbia, South 
Carolina. Currently, Safety-Kleen and 73 of its United States subsidiaries are seeking 
relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (District of 
Delaware Case No. 00-2303). (RA 185, Tf 2.) 
8. Taylor has never visited Utah for personal reasons. (RA 185-84, f^ 3.) 
Taylor owns no real property in Utah, has no immediate family in Utah, and has never 
conducted any personal business in Utah. Taylor is an attorney licensed in the State of 
South Carolina. Taylor is not a member of the State Bar of Utah, and has never appeared 
pro hac vice in any Utah court, state or federal. Taylor does not maintain a residence or 
office in Utah. Taylor has never maintained any bank accounts in Utah. Taylor is not a 
member of any limited partnership, general partnership, limited liability company, joint 
venture, or other business entity in Utah. Taylor has never paid or owed any taxes, 
including, but not limited to, income or gross receipt taxes, in or to the State of Utah. 
Taylor has never been a party to any lawsuit in Utah, or otherwise availed himself of the 
laws of the State of Utah. (RA 183, H 10.) 
9. All of Taylor's physical contacts with Utah have been solely in his capacity 
as a corporate agent for Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc., which is incorporated in the State of 
Oklahoma. Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc., is a subsidiary of Safety-Kleen Services, Inc., 
which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Safety-Kleen. Taylor was Secretary of Safety-Kleen 
(Clive), Inc., from approximately January 1, 1995, through March 17, 2000. From 
approximately March 17, 2000, through approximately November 16, 2001, Taylor was 
President and director of Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc. (RA 185-84, ^ 3.) 
10. As part of Taylor's corporate duties on behalf of Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc., 
to the best of Taylor's recollection, he has made only one (1) trip to Utah. Taylor 
believes this trip occurred in or around May of 1995, and involved a trip to Safety-Kleen 
(Clive), Inc.'s incineration facility in Clive, Utah (since he had never seen it), and a 
meeting with various Utah regulators concerning new management of this facility. This 
trip to Utah involved no personal business for Taylor. (RA 184, *| 4.) 
11. Other than Taylor's one trip to Utah on behalf of Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc., 
he does not recall ever traveling to Utah on behalf of any other entity related to Safety-
d 
Kleen, including Safety-Kleen itself. The Bond Issuance underlying this litigation had 
nothing to do with Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc. (RA 184, f 5.) 
12. Taylor has not been to Utah in any capacity since his last visit here in or 
about May 1995. (RA 184, | 6.) 
13. Safety-Kleen currently has two (2) subsidiaries that are limited liability 
companies organized under the laws of the State of Utah - SK Services, L.C, and SK 
Services (East), L.C. Taylor previously served as Secretary of these Utah limited liability 
companies, although existing corporate records do not reflect the entire period of time 
during which Taylor held such position. (RA 184, ^ f 7.) 
14. Safety-Kleen previously had two other subsidiaries organized or 
incorporated in Utah - ECDC Environmental, L.C, and East Carbon Development 
Financial Partners, Inc. The first of these corporations was sold in approximately 
November of 1997, and the second was merged into Safety-Kleen (US), Inc., in August 
1998. Taylor does not believe he ever served as an officer or manager of these 
companies, and no corporate records reviewed by Taylor show that he was ever listed as 
such. (RA 184, If 8.) 
15. None of the four (4) Utah-based subsidiaries of Safety-Kleen referred to 
above were involved in the Bond Issuance underlying the instant civil action. Taylor 
does not recall ever traveling to Utah on behalf of any of these entities. (RA 183,19.) 
16. Taylor never spoke with any representative of the Appellants in this action 
with respect to the Bond Issuance. At the time of the Bond Issuance, Taylor had no basis 
to know that any of the Appellants in this action had any connection to Utah. Taylor 
never personally attended any meetings in Utah pertaining to the Bond Issuance. (RA 
183, f 11.) Indeed, Taylor's role in the issuance of the bonds that are the subject matter 
of the current litigation was limited to acts taken solely in his capacity as corporate Vice 
President, Secretary, and/or General Counsel for Safety-Kleen, as follows: 
• On or about July 9, 2001, Taylor affixed his signature to the 
General Certificate of Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. for 
the purpose of identifying himself as the General Counsel for and 
an Authorized Borrower Representative of LESI. 
• On June 3, 1997, acting in his corporate capacity as Secretary of 
LESI, Taylor affixed his signature to a Certificate of Change of 
Registered Agent and Registered Office (the "Registered Agent 
Certificate"), attesting to LESI's designation of The Corporation 
Trust Company as its registered agent. A copy of the Registered 
Agent Certificate was included as an exhibit to the General 
Certificate of Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. in 
connection with the Bond Issuance. 
• The Loan Agreement between LESI and Tooele County, Utah, 
which is dated July 1, 1997, also bears Taylor's signature in his 
corporate capacity as Vice President, General Counsel, and 
Secretary. The sole purpose of this signature was to attest to the 
signature of Paul R. Humphreys, the Senior Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer of LESI. 
• On or about July 9, 1997, in his capacity as General Counsel for 
LESI, Taylor caused to be delivered a letter in which he 
expressed certain opinions pursuant to Section 7(c)(1) of the July 
2, 1997 Bond Placement Agreement. Importantly, however, the 
July 9, 1997 letter specifically exempts from its coverage any 
opinions or representations regarding certain portions of the 
Offering Memorandum, including the financial statements of 
LESI contained in the Offering Memorandum. 
(RA 183-82, ffl 12-15; RA 191-88.) 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's judgment, if only because Appellants 
failed to marshal evidence supporting the dismissal of Henry Taylor. This appeal is 
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based entirely on the misguided argument that Taylor is subject to Utah jurisdiction 
solely because Appellants have sued him under Utah's securities laws. Alleged liability, 
and personal jurisdiction, are distinct. By focusing solely on alleged liability, Appellants 
ask this Court to ignore the constitutional due process principles at the heart of personal 
jurisdiction analysis. Allowing Utah to exercise jurisdiction over Taylor, simply because 
Utah has enacted a statute purportedly creating presumptive liability against Taylor 
because of his status as an officer of a corporation, would impermissibly deprive Taylor 
of due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
Thus, notwithstanding Appellants' lengthy discussion of Taylor's alleged liability 
under Utah's securities laws, the issue before this Court is straightforward - whether 
Utah's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Taylor violates due process of law. It does. 
Appellants have offered no evidence to meet their burden of demonstrating that Taylor, a 
resident of South Carolina, personally and purposefully availed himself of the privilege 
of transacting business in Utah such that the exercise of jurisdiction over Taylor would 
comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, the only 
evidence alleged by Appellants is merely that Taylor was an officer of LESI at the time 
of the Bond Issuance, and that Taylor signed various documents in connection with the 
Bond Issuance in his corporate capacity. But those simple acts are legally insufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction over Taylor in his individual capacity. 
Even if Taylor's alleged corporate contacts with Utah were considered by the 
Court, those contacts have nothing to do with the alleged financial misrepresentations 
upon which Appellants base their entire complaint. Tellingly, Appellants' complaint 
contains no allegations of intentional conduct by Taylor in connection with the alleged 
financial misrepresentations. 
Taylor, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's order 
dismissing the complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
V, ARGUMENT 
This Court recently clarified the test for determining whether personal jurisdiction 
exists over a nonresident defendant. It stated: 
The proper test to be applied in determining whether personal 
jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant involves two 
considerations. First, the court must assess whether Utah law 
confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 
This means that a court may rely on any Utah statute 
affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm 
statute. Second, assuming Utah law confers personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court must 
assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the 
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
D.A., 63 P.3d at 612; see Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 
1122 (Utah 1992) ("Generally, whether a state can exercise specific jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant is determined by two factors: the breadth of the forum state's 
jurisdictional statute and the due process limitations on jurisdiction imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."). See also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-22 (long-arm statute authorizing jurisdiction to the "extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution"). 
Accordingly, Utah courts "frequently make a due process analysis first because any set of 
circumstances that satisfies due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." SII 
R 
MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Am. Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998); see 
Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122-23. 
Utah follows federal precedent. "To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due 
process, the nonresident defendant must have 'minimum contacts with the forum state 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.5" Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1123 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "In order to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice, [the Utah Supreme Court] has recognized that 'the central concern of the inquiry 
into personal jurisdiction is the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation, to each other.'" Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 
(Utah 1985) (quoting Mallory Eng'g v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 
(Utah 1980)). The assessment of that relationship involves determining "whether the 
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." IcL (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation omitted); see SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (quoting 
Asahi Metal Indus Co., v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)) ("a finding of 
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum state"). In addition, the cause of action must arise out of or have a 
substantial connection with the activities within the forum state. Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 
1110; see SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) ("the 
contested obligations must 'arise out of and be connected with the activities of the forum 
state5"). "Finally, 'the determination of whether Utah can justify asserting personal 
jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of the fairness to the parties and the 
interests of the State in asserting jurisdiction.'" SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 435 
(quoting Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110-11). 
Appellants do not and cannot allege that Taylor engaged in any conduct directed at 
or in Utah. Appellants argue only that Utah courts have specific jurisdiction over Taylor, 
conceding that Utah courts lack general jurisdiction over Taylor. (Appellants' Opening 
Brief ("Appellants' Op. Br."), at 14.) "Specific jurisdiction gives a court power over a 
defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the 
defendant in the forum state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have 
certain minimum local contacts." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122. 
Importantly, Appellants "bear[] the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction" 
over Taylor, Far West Capital Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1075 (10th Cir. 1995). See 
also Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 708 (Utah 1974). Where, as here, Taylor 
supports a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction with affidavit testimony, 
Appellants must make a prima facie showing of proper jurisdiction by affirmative 
evidence. See Anderson v. Am. Soc'v of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 
825, 827 (Utah 1990). No such rebuttal was offered or attempted here. 
As demonstrated below, Appellants failed to meet their burden, and thus this Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision. 
A. Appellants Failed To Marshal Evidence. 
Contrary to Appellants' statement on page 2 of their brief, that the trial court's 
ruling was "based on documentary evidence alone," the trial court relied, in part, on 
affidavits, including the affidavit of defendant and appellee Henry Taylor. Under Utah 
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law, appellants were required to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This 
failure to marshal unrebutted evidence dooms this appeal. 
B. Regardless Of How Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) And Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-26(8) Are Construed, Neither Can Be Read To Confer Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Taylor. 
Appellants set forth the following rationale for why personal jurisdiction over all 
of the individual defendants is proper: 
(1) securities were issued or caused to be issued in Utah by 
LES; (2) the securities were offered and sold to Appellants by 
way of false or misleading statements; and (3) Appellees were 
directors and officers of LES at the time of the Issuance. 
(Appellants' Op. Br., at 18.) Based on these facts, Appellants contend that defendants 
"are presumed by [Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4)] to have knowingly or negligently 
committed a tort having effects in this state, thereby satisfying the 'minimum contacts' 
test for jurisdiction." (Appellants' Op. Br., at 46.) Indeed, Appellants' arguments are 
based solely on defendants presumed, rather than actual, acts. (Appellants' Op. Br., at 
16-18, 28-32.) Appellants then argue that through Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26, the Utah 
Legislature intended to confer personal jurisdiction over all persons potentially liable 
under Utah's securities laws, including those persons presumptively liable under Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). (Appellants' Op. Br., at 36-38.) Thus, Appellants reason, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants is entirely proper. 
Appellants confuse liability with jurisdiction, ignore due process requirements, 
and thus erroneously rely on Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) and § 61-1-26. 
1. Because Liability Is Distinct From Jurisdiction, It Is Not Enough For 
Appellants Merely To Show That Taylor Is Presumptively Liable 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). 
Without considering personal jurisdiction issues, the Utah Legislature enacted 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(4)(a), which provides: 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or 
buyer liable under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or 
director of such a seller or buyer, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, every 
employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the 
sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who 
materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally 
with and to the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless 
the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
Nothing in this section indicates any intent on the part of the Utah Legislature to subject 
officers or directors to personal jurisdiction in Utah. By its terms, Utah Code Ann. §61-
l-22(4)(a) merely creates a rebuttable presumption that Taylor, as an officer of LESI at 
the time of the Bond Issuance, is liable under Utah's securities laws. However, alleged 
liability and purposefully availing oneself of a state's laws are qualitatively and legally 
different. 
Merely because Taylor may be presumed liable does not mean that he is subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Utah. "Liability and jurisdiction are independent. Liability 
depends on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants and between the 
individual defendants; jurisdiction depends only upon each defendant's relationship with 
the forum." Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Shaffer v. 
Heitaer, 433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.19 (1977)). Thus, regardless of the defendants' potential 
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joint liability, "jurisdiction over each defendant must be established individually." Id. 
(citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)). 
Based on these fundamental principles, the court in Sher found that it lacked 
personal jurisdiction over individual partners, even though the court had jurisdiction over 
the partnership and the partners were jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the 
partnership. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1365-66. Similarly, the court in American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1996), 
found that it lacked jurisdiction over a defendant's parent corporation even though that 
corporation was liable for environmental cleanup costs under federal law. Id at 590-91 
("Even if [the parent corporation] would be liable under CERCLA, AT&T may not use 
liability as a substitute for personal jurisdiction. . . . [Liability is not to be conflated with 
amenability to suit in a particular forum."). Other cases have also found that liability is 
no substitute for jurisdiction. See Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910, 915 
(8th Cir. 1994) ("Generally, when the corporate veil is pierced, the individuals may be 
liable for the corporation's actions. Whether an individual is subject to the jurisdiction of 
a federal court is a separate threshold issue, which the district court conflated with the 
issue of the individuals' liability for corporate actions.") (internal citation omitted); 
Langloisv.DeiaVu,Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D. Wash. 1997) ("Even if a 
congressional statute paints as broad a liability stroke as possible, the individuals subject 
to liability under such statute would still only be amenable to suit in the jurisdiction 
where it would be 'fair' to call them into court." To hold otherwise would "knock heads 
with the United States Constitution."). 
All of these cases are analogous to the situation here, where Appellants have 
argued that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Taylor because Taylor is 
presumptively liable under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22. As in the above cases, however, 
Appellants may not use liability as a substitute for personal jurisdiction. While neither 
the Utah state or federal courts nor the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the 
issue decided by the Ninth Circuit in Sher and American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company, the rule of those cases has been favorably cited by other federal courts in the 
Tenth Circuit. See SBKC Serv. Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P., 969 F. Supp. 1254, 
1260 (D. Kan. 1997), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 153 F.3d 728 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(finding, based on the Sher court's "well reasoned analysis," that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over the general partner even though it had jurisdiction over the partnership). 
In addition, several courts have applied the fundamental distinction between 
liability and jurisdiction to situations where, as here, control persons are alleged to be 
liable under the applicable securities laws. In Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 662 
P.2d 553 (1983), the Kansas Supreme Court found that no personal jurisdiction existed 
over two directors of a corporation that allegedly sold securities based on false and 
misleading statements. In so holding, the court specifically rejected the argument that 
because the directors were presumptively liable under Kansas Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) -
Kansas Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) provides: 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under 
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director (or person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions) or employee of such a seller 
who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who 
materially aids in the sale is also liable jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as the seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that such nonseller did not know, and in the exercise of 
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which is nearly identical to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) - they necessarily were subject 
to jurisdiction in Kansas. Id. at 563. "It is true that the statute establishes the basis for 
liability of persons involved in the sale of unregistered securities but it does not establish 
the jurisdiction of the court to submit such persons to liability." Id. The court proceeded 
to find that the corporate directors lacked the minimum contacts with Kansas "necessary 
to satisfy federal constitutional due process requirements." Id. 
Similarly, in Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 265 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1990), the 
plaintiffs alleged that personal jurisdiction existed over corporate officers and directors 
based on allegations of their control person liability under California Corporations Code 
§ 25504 - the California equivalent of Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(4).3 Id at 677 & n.3. 
The court rejected this argument, and found that no minimum contacts existed because 
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by 
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in 
cases of contract among the several persons so liable. 
3
 California Corporations Code § 25504 provides: 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under 
Section 25501 or 25503, every partner in a firm so liable, every principal 
executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person 
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee 
of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or transaction 
constituting the violation, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially 
aids in the act or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly 
and severally with and to the same extent as such person, unless the other 
person who is so liable had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to 
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is 
alleged to exist. 
"[t]here is no evidence that they participated in or directed any tortious acts or omission 
either within or without California." Id. at 678.4 
Finally, the court in In Re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, 81 F. Supp. 2d 75 
(D.D.C. 2000) rejected the argument that a showing of control person liability under 
federal securities acts was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the control person, stating 
that such a theory "goes too far." Id at 79-82. In a subsequent opinion, the court in In re 
Baan reiterated its earlier ruling, again rejected jurisdiction based solely on an allegation 
of control person liability, and noted that such an approach "impermissibly conflates 
statutory liability with the Constitution's command that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction must be fundamentally fair." In re Baan, 245 F. Supp. 2d 117, 129 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
2. Appellants' Cases Are Unavailing. 
The cases relied upon by Appellants do not inform a decision here. Appellants 
rely heavily on San Mateo County Transit District v. Fitzgerald, 979 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 
1992), for the proposition that personal jurisdiction over an individual exists "if the 
plaintiff makes a non-frivolous allegation that the defendant controlled a person liable for 
the fraud." (Appellants5 Op. Br., at 26.) While at first glance the Ninth Circuit's ruling 
in San Mateo may seem to support Appellants' position, further examination reveals that 
San Mateo has no application here. 
In San Mateo, the plaintiff sought to hold the Treasurer and Vice President of a 
brokerage firm, as well as the brokerage firm itself, liable under the federal Securities Act 
4
 In a case with many of the same parties to the present appeal, the California Court of 
Appeal recently rejected the very same arguments made by Appellants here. The 
decision was not published. 
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of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1357. The officer moved to 
dismiss on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Id. 
Specifically, the officer argued that he was not a "controlling person" within the meaning 
of Section 20(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), and therefore the court lacked 
jurisdiction over him under the Securities Act. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1357. The trial 
court agreed with the officer, and granted his motion to dismiss. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that jurisdiction over the officer existed 
because the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of potential liability as a control 
person under Section 20(a) of the Securities Act. Id. at 1357-58. To reach this 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit examined the provision of the Securities Act dealing with 
service of process, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the 
Securities Act authorized worldwide service of process and permitted jurisdiction over 
the defendant "wherever he may be found," the district court improperly dismissed the 
officer for lack of personal jurisdiction. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1358. 
Notably, however, the court in San Mateo did not engage in a due process analysis 
to determine whether the officer had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. 
Id. at 1357-58. Indeed, such an analysis would have been improper, since the officer was 
being accused, in federal court, of violating a federal statute. 
'Minimum contacts' with a particular district or state for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction is not a limitation imposed 
on the federal courts in a federal question case by due process 
concerns. The Constitution does not require the federal 
districts to follow state boundaries. It is clear that Congress 
can provide for nationwide service of process in federal court 
for federal question cases without falling short of the 
requirements of due process. 
Sec. Investor Prot Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309,1315 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other 
grounds, Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (quoting Johnson v. 
Creative Arts & Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in 
original). Thus, because Section 27 of the Securities Act authorizes worldwide service of 
process, the question of whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a particular 
party "becomes whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States, not any 
particular state." Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1315-16. 
This distinction in the minimum contacts analysis under the federal securities laws 
is critical to understanding why the holding in San Mateo does not support Appellants' 
position. There was no dispute in San Mateo as to whether the officer had sufficient 
minimum contacts with the United States. Whether the officer had sufficient minimum 
contacts with California was irrelevant, because the only dispute was whether the 
plaintiff had adequately stated a claim for liability under the Securities Act. Under the 
specific facts presented in San Mateo, therefore, the issues of liability and personal 
jurisdiction were one and the same. That is not so here. 
The personal jurisdiction analysis applied in San Mateo is far different from the 
analysis where, as here, a state court's jurisdiction rests on a state long-arm statute. See 
Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1315 (noting that the line of cases flowing from International Shoe 
apply where the issue involves a state court's jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant). 
In such cases, the state court must determine whether the defendant purposefully 
established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. 
As a result of this difference, it is unfortunate, although perhaps not surprising, 
that the court in San Mateo found that "[i]f the suit is to enforce a liability created by the 
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Securities Act, the [district] court has jurisdiction over the defendant wherever he may be 
found." San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1358. But as at least one court has correctly noted, this 
one sentence from San Mateo, if "read to permit the exercise of jurisdiction based on no 
more than an allegation that the defendant controlled the entity which performed that act 
complained of," is "utterly inconsistent with the persistent insistence of the Supreme 
Court. . . that personal jurisdiction be premised on a showing that the defendant has, by 
his acts, purposefully availed himself of the forum's benefits." In Re Baan, 81 F. Supp. 
2d at 81-82 (internal citation omitted); see In re Baan, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 129 ("it simply 
goes too far to hold, as the Ninth Circuit did in San Mateo, that mere control status is 
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction"). The language of San Mateo upon which 
Appellants rely, therefore, must be specifically limited to the facts and law before the 
court in that case. San Mateo, therefore, does not and should not support Appellants' 
position here. 
Appellants' reliance on other federal district court cases decided under the federal 
Securities Act is similarly misplaced. (See Appellants' Op. Br., at 43-45.) In the cases 
cited by Appellants - each of which deals with the issue of whether a defendant foreign 
to the United States could be subject to suit within the United States - the federal court 
simply did not conclude that an individual's presumed liability as a control person was 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over those individuals. Instead, in each case the federal 
court carefully examined the culpable conduct of each individual defendant involved to 
determine whether each defendant had purposefully established sufficient minimum 
contacts with the United States. In Re Baan, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 79-82 (carefully analyzing 
the cases cited by Appellants here, and concluding that each of the cases "required more 
than the allegation that defendant controlled the entity which performed the act claimed 
to have violated the pertinent securities law before asserting jurisdiction over its person"); 
see McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 640-41 (E.D. Tex. 1999) 
(separately analyzing culpable conduct of each individual defendant to determine whether 
jurisdiction was proper); Derensis v. Coopers & Lvbrand Chartered Accountants. 930 F. 
Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.N.J. 1996) (sustaining exercise of jurisdiction over individuals 
based on allegation that "they approved and disseminated financial statements that they 
knew would influence the price of Nesmont securities on the NASDAQ market"); Landry 
v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 715 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(finding that jurisdiction over individual defendant was proper because he was a "behind 
the scenes player" in the transaction). 
Accordingly, the cases cited by Appellants offer no support for their assertion that 
the issues of liability and jurisdiction are one and the same. Thus, Appellants' allegations 
that Taylor is presumptively liable under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) are, by 
themselves, insufficient to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over Taylor. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26 Is Merely A Service Of Process Statute And 
Does Not Provide An Independent Basis For Jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26 provides, in pertinent part: 
When any person, including any nonresident of this state, 
engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable by this 
chapter or any rule or order hereunder, and he has not filed a 
consent to service of process under Subsection (7) and 
personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained 
in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his 
appointment of the division or the director to be his attorney 
to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal 
suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor 
executor or administrator which grows out of that conduct 
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and which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on 
him personally. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a). 
Appellants argue that this provision grants Utah courts personal jurisdiction to 
enforce Utah's securities laws in any case where an individual is presumptively liable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). (Appellants' Op. Br., at 36-38.) Appellants read 
this statute much too broadly, and ignore the due process issues at the heart of any 
jurisdictional analysis. 
As recently explained by the Utah Supreme Court: 
[A]ny legislative enactment of personal jurisdiction, in or 
out of the long-arm statute, cannot justify on its own the 
assertion of jurisdiction. The true safeguard on the 
extension of personal jurisdiction is the constitutional due 
process analysis, with its focus on minimum contacts and 
on traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
Therefore, this test recognizes the legislature's authority to 
provide for the extension of personal jurisdiction as limited 
by established constitutional due process requirements. 
D A , 63 P.3d at 612 (emphasis added). Accordingly, regardless of who the Utah 
Legislature intended to reach through Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8), the exercise of 
jurisdiction over any person still must comport with due process. 
Other courts have properly rejected attempts to utilize broad service of process 
statutes as a basis for jurisdiction. See Tri-West Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Seguros Monterrey 
Aetna, S.A., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiffs 
argument that personal jurisdiction existed in light of a broad service of process statute, 
and finding that before service of process statutes may be utilized to obtain jurisdiction 
over a nonresident, the power to exercise jurisdiction must be found to exist and must be 
consistent with due process); Bank of Am. v. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. GAC Props. 
Credit, Inc., 389 A.2d 1304, 1309 (Del. Ch. 1978) (explaining that a state's service of 
process statutes can only be applied to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
where such nonresidents have constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum state); In re Baan, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (noting that the service of process statute 
under the Securities Exchange Act, providing for service of process "wherever the 
defendant may be found," does not end the jurisdictional inquiry. "[T]he court's 
assertion of personal jurisdiction must, as always, comport with the requirements of the 
Constitution.") 
The two state cases relied upon by Appellants are unpersuasive and 
distinguishable. (Appellants' Op. Br., at 37-38.) Neither case stands for the proposition 
that a service of process statute is sufficient, in and of itself, to confer personal 
jurisdiction over officers or directors when their corporations sell securities in the forum 
state. 
In the first case, an unpublished decision from the Massachusetts Superior Court, 
personal jurisdiction was found proper over the CEO and majority shareholder of a 
company that sold shares based on representations that the company would obtain and 
manage wireless cable television stations. American Microtek Inc. v. Massachusetts, No. 
93-5874, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 593, at *28-30 (Apr. 10, 1995). The court found that 
jurisdiction existed over the CEO of the corporation based on an administrative finding, 
supported by the CEO's testimony, that the CEO controlled the corporation. Id The 
court then stated, without analysis, that because the CEO controlled the corporation, 
jurisdiction over him could be obtained through the service of process provisions in 
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Massachusetts' securities laws. Id. Here, there has been no finding or even allegation 
that Taylor controlled LESI. In fact, Appellants have not submitted any evidence that 
Taylor actually controlled LESI generally or controlled the Bond Issuance specifically. 
Absent such evidence, or any other evidence showing Taylor's minimum contacts with 
Utah, the service of process statue is entirely irrelevant. In any event, to the extent 
American Microtel can be read to support Appellants' argument that a state can exercise 
jurisdiction over individuals by creating presumptive liability and enacting a broad 
service of process statute, it is inconsistent with the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court 
and the United States Supreme Court, as explained at length throughout this brief. 
The second state case relied on by Appellants is equally unavailing. In that case, 
an investment broker in South Carolina brokered the sale of shares in a Louisiana oil well 
held by two foreign corporations, Summit and Cajun. Brown v. Inv. Mgmt. & Research, 
Inc., 475 S.E.2d 754, 755 (S.C. 1996). The court based its finding of jurisdiction on its 
acceptance of the facts as pled in the complaint, which alleged that the defendants 
transacted business in the state through its investment broker, made fraudulent 
misrepresentations through that broker, and sold securities in the state. IcL at 757. 
Importantly, the court did not tie or equate jurisdiction over the officers and/or directors 
of the defendant corporations because of their joint and several liability under South 
Carolina's securities laws. In fact, the officers and directors of the defendant 
corporations were not even defendants in the lawsuit. Id, at 755. The only individual 
defendants before the court were the direct agents of the defendant corporations, and 
those individuals were allegedly liable and subject to jurisdiction for their own 
affirmative acts in selling securities in South Carolina. Id at 755, 757-58. And, because 
the individuals had engaged in these affirmative acts, they were subject to service under 
South Carolina's service of process statute. Id. at 757. In other words, the service of 
process statutes only became relevant to the jurisdictional analysis after the defendants 
were found to have engaged in sufficient acts directed at the forum state. Id Brown, 
therefore, does not support Appellants' argument. 
Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8) - a service of process statute - cannot 
and should not provide the basis for jurisdiction over Taylor here unless the exercise of 
such jurisdiction otherwise comports with due process. As demonstrated below, 
however, Appellants failed to and could not make this showing. 
C. Appellants Have Failed To Establish That Taylor Has Sufficient Minimum 
Contacts With Utah Such That Asserting Jurisdiction Over Him Would 
Comport With Due Process. 
Once this Court properly focuses on the due process analysis and applies the facts, 
it will find that Taylor lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Utah. Thus, asserting 
jurisdiction over him would violate due process. Contrary to Appellants' arguments, 
minimum contacts cannot be established by presumed acts, and cannot be established 
based on the acts of others. 
1. Appellants Have Failed To Establish That Taylor Purposefully Availed 
Himself Of The Privilege Of Conducting Personal Business In Utah. 
Taylor had no contacts with Utah in his personal capacity. (RA 185-83, fflf 3-6, 
10.) Moreover, while Taylor was an officer and/or director of various Safety-Kleen 
subsidiaries incorporated in Utah, those subsidiaries were not involved in the Bond 
Issuance, and have no connection with the financial statements underlying Appellants' 
complaint. (RA 185-83, fflf 3-9.) Finally, Appellants have not offered any evidence that 
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Taylor committed any intentional act that was expressly aimed at Utah. Significantly, 
Appellants do not even allege that Taylor made any intentional misrepresentation or 
committed any intentional act expressly aimed at Utah. To the contrary, the allegations 
against Taylor are based solely on untargeted, unintentional acts, and alleged negligence. 
(RA 10-02, Yl 67-76, 77-88, 108-121.) 
At most, therefore, Appellants can establish that Taylor, in his capacity as an 
officer or General Counsel of Safety-Kleen, signed a few documents in connection with 
the Bond Issuance. (RA 183-82, ^ f 12-15.) By signing various documents in his 
corporate capacity, however, Taylor in no way "purposefully availed himself of the 
privilege of conducting personal activities in Utah. See LeDuc v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 
814 F. Supp. 820, 824-25 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (rejecting assertion that directors of 
corporation purposefully availed themselves of the California forum where the directors 
signed agency contracts which assisted the corporation in developing further business in 
California); Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Am. Title Co. of Utah 772 F. Supp. 574, 
579 (D. Utah 1991) (where individual's contact with Utah was as an agent for client, such 
contact cannot be considered "purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting 
activities in Utah" for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over such individual); 
Goehring v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 112-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (by 
signing various documents related to the transaction at issue, including a sales agreement, 
a security agreement, an escrow agreement, and a UCC financing statement, the partners 
did not purposefully establish minimum contacts with California). See also Dobbs v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of claims 
against individuals based on lack of general or specific jurisdiction over corporate 
employees where actions in forum state were minor and presence in the forum state was 
at the direction of the employer); Seagate Tech. v. A.J. Kogvo Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 586, 
590-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("no personal contact would result from doing nothing more 
than ratifying an act taken by the corporation or another corporate officer"). 
Although it is not entirely clear, Appellants apparently argue that when LESI 
issued the bonds in Utah, it must have been acting as Taylor's agent as well as the agent 
of the other individual defendants. (See Appellants5 Op. Br., at 29, 31-32.) Tellingly, 
Appellants provide no legal support for their argument that a corporation acts as an agent 
for its officers and directors, or that officers and directors act as agents for one another, 
for purposes of constitutional due process analysis. In fact, just the opposite is true. 
It is well-established that "[e]ach defendant's contacts with the forum State must 
be assessed individually," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 782, n.13 
(1984), and that the assertion of jurisdiction over one defendant based on the activities of 
another would be "plainly unconstitutional." Rush, 444 U.S. at 331-32 (the requirements 
of International Shoe "must be met as to each defendant"). Indeed, the purposeful 
availment requirement ensures that a party will not be haled into court "solely as a result 
of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another 
party or a third person.'" Burger King Corp. v. Radzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) 
(internal citations omitted). Thus, an individual's contacts with the forum state are not to 
be judged according to his or her employer's in-forum activities. Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783, 790 (1984). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically ruled that an 
individual's mere status as an officer of a corporation is insufficient to give rise to 
personal jurisdiction over that individual. SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (finding 
that Utah lacked jurisdiction over two officers of the defendant corporation). Contrary to 
Appellants' suggestions, therefore, the acts of LESI and/or Safety-Kleen are entirely 
irrelevant to the question of whether Utah can assume personal jurisdiction over Taylor. 
Appellants additionally suggest that because Taylor should have foreseen being 
subject to potential liability in Utah as an officer of LESI, he necessarily and purposefully 
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah when he signed various 
documents related to the Bond Issuance in his corporate capacity. In demonstrating 
purposeful availment for jurisdiction purposes, however, "the mere fact that [the 
defendant] can 'foresee' that [his conduct will] have an effect in [the forum state] is not 
sufficient for an assertion of jurisdiction." Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. Likewise, 
the mere allegation that an out-of-state defendant has 
tortiously interfered with contractual rights or has committed 
other business torts that have allegedly injured a forum 
resident does not necessarily establish that the defendant 
possesses the constitutionally required minimum contacts. 
Instead, in order to resolve the jurisdictional question, a court 
must undertake a particularized inquiry as to the extent to 
which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the 
benefits of the forum's laws. 
Far West Capital 46 F.3d at 1079. 
Accordingly, Appellants have failed to prove that Taylor purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah. 
2. Appellants' Claims Do Not Arise Out Of Or Have A Substantial 
Connection With Taylor's Limited Corporate Contacts With Utah. 
Appellants do not dispute that Taylor signed only a few documents in relation to 
the Bond Issuance. Moreover, and more importantly, Appellants do not contend that 
their claims "arise out o f or have a "substantial connection with" those documents. 
Indeed, any such contention would be frivolous. Appellants' complaint, by its terms, 
predicates liability on claims of false and misleading financial information, yet 
Appellants have not alleged that Taylor personally made any such misstatements or that 
Taylor engaged in any intentional conduct. (RA 10-02,ffi[ 67-76, 77-88,108-121.) The 
absence of such allegations is not surprising because, in none of the documents signed by 
Taylor in connection with the Bond Issuance, does Taylor either explicitly or implicitly 
attest to LESI's financial condition. (RA 183-82,fflf 12-15.) 
Of the few documents signed by Taylor, the only document even remotely 
connected with Appellants' allegations of material misrepresentations is Taylor's opinion 
letter dated July 9, 1997. (RA 183-82, ffi[ 12-15.) That letter, which Taylor wrote in his 
capacity as General Counsel of LESI, was delivered to Utah as part of the bond 
transaction closing documents. In that letter, however, Taylor specifically indicated he 
was not expressing any opinion regarding the LESI financial statements, or the financial 
state of LESI generally. (RA 182, \ 15; RA 191-88.) Thus, even if Taylor's acts in his 
corporate capacity were considered to be acts by which Taylor purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah, Appellants cannot prove that 
their claims "arise out o f or have "substantial connection with" Taylor's letter of July 9, 
1997, or any of the other documents signed by Taylor in connection with the Bond 
Issuance. Certainly, Taylor could not have reasonably anticipated that signing these 
documents would have subjected him to being hauled into court in Utah to defend against 
allegations regarding alleged misrepresentations of LESI's financial condition. Those 
contacts had nothing to do with the alleged misrepresentations regarding LESFs financial 
condition that form the basis of Appellants' claims in this lawsuit. 
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Appellants' claims against Taylor, therefore, arise out of the mere fact that Taylor 
was an officer of LESI at the time the Bonds were issued. But, as explained, that is not 
enough to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Taylor. See SII 
MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437. 
3. Appellants' Reliance On Taylor's "Presumed" Contacts With Utah Is 
Misplaced, Since Basing Personal Jurisdiction on Presumed Acts 
Would Violate Due Process. 
Appellants do not and cannot dispute that Taylor has no personal contacts with 
Utah, or that his only acts connected to Utah were taken in his corporate capacity. 
Appellants nevertheless seek to avoid the substantial inadequacy of their evidentiary 
showing by arguing that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4), Taylor and the other 
individual defendants are presumed to have committed tortious acts causing effects in 
Utah. Appellants' argument ignores fundamental due process principles at the heart of 
the jurisdictional analysis. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "specific person jurisdiction arises 
only out of the actual transactions between the defendant and the forum state." SII 
MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has 
similarly recognized that jurisdiction is proper only where the contacts with the forum 
state "proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial 
connection' with the forum state." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (emphasis in original); 
see Asahi Metal 480 U.S. at 112 ("A finding of minimum contacts must come about by 
an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state") (emphasis 
added). 
The above is true regardless of the Utah Legislature's apparent intent to hold 
officers and directors individually liable under its securities laws. The Utah Legislature 
cannot circumvent the due process protections of the United States Constitution. See 
D.A., 63 P.3d at 612. Indeed, if "presumed" acts could serve as the basis for specific 
jurisdiction, then a state could easily avoid the limits on jurisdiction imposed by the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, if Appellants' argument 
were correct, any state legislature could exercise jurisdiction over an individual simply by 
enacting a statute declaring that such individual is presumed to be jointly and severally 
liable based on a presumption that the individual engaged in certain acts. This could 
never be the law. 
A state legislature's powers are not and should not be as broad as Appellants 
suggest. The concept of "minimum contacts" not only protects defendants from the 
burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum, but it also "ensure[s] that the 
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their 
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). In other words, "personal jurisdiction has 
constitutional dimensions, and regardless of policy goals, [the legislature] cannot override 
the due process clause, the source of protection for non-resident defendants." American 
Tel. & Tel. Co.. 94 F.3d at 591. 
Thus, even if Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) and § 61-1-26 purport to confer 
jurisdiction based on presumptive liability alone (and they do not), constitutional due 
process mandates operate to negate the effect of those sections. 
D. This Court's Exercise Of Jurisdiction Over Taylor Would Be Inherently 
Unfair. 
Even if this Court finds that Taylor purposely established minimum contacts 
within Utah (which he did not), that finding would not end the analysis. In addition to 
the minimum contacts analysis set forth above, "the determination of whether Utah can 
justify asserting jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of the fairness to the 
parties and the interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction." SII MegaDiamond, 969 
P.2d at 435; see Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110; Brown v. Cames Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 
380 (Utah 1980). These factors strongly favor a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction 
over Taylor would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. 
1. The Burden On Taylor To Litigate In Utah Is Great. 
Taylor would labor under a heavy burden if he were forced to litigate this matter 
in Utah, over 2,000 miles from his home. See Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 
659, 668 (Utah 1989) (noting that a "non-resident defendant faces substantial 
inconvenience in litigating in a foreign forum")- This is a complex civil matter brought 
by numerous large corporations and entities. Taylor, in contrast, is an individual, and 
fairness dictates that he should not be forced to defend himself in a complex multi-party 
action far from home. 
Moreover, many if not most of the pertinent witnesses and documents are located 
in South Carolina, the state of Safety-Kleen's home office. This matter is likely to 
generate a significant volume of written discovery, and trigger extensive deposition 
testimony. Taylor's ability to attend depositions and protect his rights through direct 
participation in his defense is severely constrained by the distance between his home and 
Appellants' proposed forum. The burden placed on Taylor to meaningfully participate in 
his defense in such a remote forum is substantial, and places him at a severe 
disadvantage. Appellants do not suggest anything to the contrary. 
2. Utah's Interest In This Matter Is Slight. 
Utah has little real interest in this action. None of the Appellants are incorporated 
in Utah. (RA 21, ff 4-9.) None of the Appellants maintain their principal places of 
business in Utah. (Id.) Thus, none of the parties to this action have any real connection 
to Utah sufficient to give Utah a meaningful interest in litigating Appellants' claims. The 
fact that the Bonds were issued in Utah, by a subdivision of the state, does not weigh in 
favor of jurisdiction over Taylor. This dispute centers on LESI's financial condition and 
on the Appellants' bond holdings. Utah is not a party to the dispute, and the litigation 
does not impact the policy behind the statutory provisions creating the Bonds. Thus, the 
issuance of the Bonds by a Utah governmental entity adds nothing to Utah's interest in 
litigating this matter. 
Tellingly, the Appellants' tenuous assertion of venue in Tooele County is based 
upon the Indenture of Trust, an agreement to which Taylor is not even a party. (RA 22-
21, Tf 3.) Although venue is not at issue here, Appellants' reliance on the Indenture of 
Trust to set this matter in Utah is evidence of the remoteness of Utah's interest in this 
action. Taylor, who is not a party to the Indenture of Trust and not bound by the venue 
provision, should not be forced to litigate this matter in Utah based upon this dubious 
connection to Utah. 
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3. Appellants' Interest In Obtaining Relief Does Not Support Utah 
Jurisdiction. 
Appellants' interests in obtaining relief do not militate toward a finding that 
jurisdiction over Taylor in Utah would be fair. Appellants could just as easily litigate this 
action in an appropriate forum where jurisdiction could be had over Taylor. Appellants 
cannot show that similar relief is unavailable under the substantive law of another forum, 
or by the application of that forum's choice of law rules. Moreover, Appellants are all 
foreign to Utah, which further hampers the importance of their desire to seek relief in a 
remote forum. In short, Appellants' apparent desire to bring this action in Utah in order 
to obtain relief under Utah's securities laws is not consistent with fair play and substantial 
justice. 
4. Judicial Efficiency Does Not Support Jurisdiction. 
This matter is in its infancy. To date, Utah has invested relatively few judicial 
resources towards the prosecution of this matter. Given this relatively small investment 
of judicial resources, there is no compelling reason for this Court to continue to allow 
Appellants to litigate this claim in Utah. Moreover, Appellants cannot show that 
dismissal of this action would result in the underlying issues being litigated in multiple 
fora. The most appropriate forum for this action is South Carolina, and there is no 
impediment to Appellants litigating their claims there. Judicial efficiency supports a 
finding that exercise of jurisdiction over Taylor is not reasonable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Appellants confuse jurisdictional issues with liability issues. They ignore the due 
process requirements at the very heart of any jurisdictional analysis, set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court. Regardless of the potential scope 
of liability for Taylor under Utah's securities laws, Utah courts lack personal jurisdiction 
over Taylor because the exercise of such jurisdiction over him would not comport with 
due process. Taylor's only connection with Utah stems from his corporate acts as an 
agent of LESI and/or Safety-Kleen - acts that have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
alleged misrepresentations forming the basis of this lawsuit. 
Moreover, Appellants do not and cannot dispute that forcing Taylor to defend 
himself in Utah would seriously prejudice Taylor, and would not serve any legitimate 
purpose since the Appellants, too, are foreign to Utah, and Utah has only a slight interest 
in this matter. 
Accordingly, Taylor respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of the complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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